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CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw-CoNGRBssroNAL PoWERs-VALIDITY OF THE 1951 
GAMBLERS' OccuPATIONAL TAX Acrr-The Revenue Act of 19511 levied a tax 
on persons engaged in the business of accepting wagers, requiring such persons 
to register their names and places of business and residence with the Collector 
of Internal Revenue. The act also required the disclosure of the name and 
address of each person receiving wagers for the registrant, or, if the registrant 
himself received wagers for another, the name of that person. Violations of 
the act were punishable by fine and imprisonment. Defendant was indicted 
for willful failure to register and pay the tax. The district court granted 
defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that the pertinent sections of the 
act were unconstitutional as an infringement of the powers reserved to the 
states by the Tenth Amendment.2 On appeal, held, reversed, three justices 
dissenting. Although Congress cannot directly regulate wagering activities, these 
activities are a proper subject for federal excise taxation and an otherwise valid 
tax is not rendered invalid merely because it discourages or deters such activities. 
The registration provisions of the Gamblers' Occupational Tax are adapted 
to the collection of the tax.3 United States 11. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 73 S. Ct. 
510 (1953). _ 
The federal government, 
any general police power.4 
in spite of its enormous powers, does not have 
Nevertheless, Congress does indirectly regulate 
126 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §§3285, 3290, 3291, 3294. 
2 The gist of the attack was that Congress, under the pretense of exercising its taxing 
power, was attempting to penalize intrastate gambling through the regulatory features of 
the act, 26 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1951) §3291. The defendant also claimed that the classifi-
cation used in the statute was arbitrary, that statutory definitions were vague, and that the 
statute violated the Fifth Amendment because it denied the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. 
3 Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, felt that "compelling self-incriminating disclosures for 
the enforcement of State gambling laws .•• under the guise of a revenue measure" showed 
that the statute, on its face, was a regulation that offended due process and violated the 
Tenth Amendment. Justices Black and Douglas went further, and stated that such provi-
sions violated the privilege against self-incrimination. The majority indicated that the proper 
time to raise this objection was at the time of registration, but even if the queston could be 
raised thereafter, the statute merely required the disclosure of future, not past, acts, merely 
informed the registrant that in order to engage in the business of wagering in the future he 
must fulfill certain conditions. 
4The delegated powers in U.S. CoNST., art. I, §8, do not include any such powers .. 
See Cushman, "Social and Economic Control Through Federal Taxation," 18 MINN. L. 
REv. 757 at 760 (1934). 
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much of the social and economic life of the nation by employing three of its 
delegated powers: the power to regulate foreign and interstate commerce, the 
power to establish post offices and post roads, and the power to levy and collect 
taxes. While police regulation through the use of the commerce and postal 
powers has often been approved, 5 similar regulations through the medium of 
taxation have not as often met with success; Merely selecting the object of 
a tax or setting the rate of levy produces some economic regulation, 6 but Con-
gress has not always stopped with such incidental regulation. Thus, attempts 
have been made to regulate or destroy the object of a so-called tax by a par-
ticularly high levy,7 by regulatioiis incidental to the tax,8 or by a combination 
of these two devices. 9 Where such tax legislation can be construed as a method 
of exercising another delegated power, it is easily sustained as such an exercise 
and not as a tax.10 But when the object of the tax is something which Congress 
could not control directly, the statute is open to attack under the Tenth Amend-
ment as an infringement of the powers reserved to the states. In the past, the 
Supreme Court's approach to such taxing ~easures has not been altogether 
consistent. It has declared that Congress has a free hand in selecting the 
objects and rates of taxation,11 and that the Court will not examine into the 
motives prompting passage of tax legislation.12 Thus, the approach employed 
in some cases has been to ascertain first if the statute, on its face, purports to 
be a revenue raising measure, and if it does to ignore the other ramifications 
of the tax.13 Using such an approach, the Court has approved a tax so large 
that its apparent purpose was not to raise revenue but to destroy the object of 
the so-called tax.14 Further, regulations attached to an otherwise valid tax 
which require registration by the person liable to pay the tax and the disclosure 
of certain information, or which require the carrying on of a taxed occupation in 
5 Congress and the Supreme Court have not always agreed on the breadth of these 
two powers, particularly in the early 1930's, but their use for purposes of social and eco-
nomic regulation has fared better in the hands of the Court than similar attempts to regu-
late by means of the taxing power. See the principal case at 514-515 and Cushman, "Social 
and Economic Control Through Federal Taxation," 18 MrnN. L. REv. 757 at 762 (1934). 
6See SHOUP, BLOUGH AND NEWCOMER, FACING THE TAX PROBLEM, c. IX (1937). 
7Veazie Bank v. Fermo, 8 Wall. (75 U.S.) 533 (1869). 
s The narcotic legislation is particularly noteworthy for its use of such regulations. See 
United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 39 S.Ct. 214 (1919); Linder v. United States, 
268 U.S. 5, 45 S.Ct. 446 (1925); Nigro v. United States, 276 U.S. 332, 48 S.Ct. 338 
(1938); see also United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 71 S.Ct. 108 (1950). 
9 For e.xample, the National Firearms Act. See Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 
506, 57 S.Ct. 554 (1937). 
10 Veazie Bank v. Fermo, note 7 supra. 
11 Sonzinsky v. United States, note 9 supra, at 512; Flint v. Stone Tracy Company, 
220 U.S. 107, 31 S.Ct. 342 (1911); McCray v. United States 195 U.S. 27, 24 S.Ct. 769 
(1903). 
12 Sonzinsky v. United States, note 9 supra, at 513; Veazie Bank v. Fenno, note 7 supra. 
13 See particularly McCray v. United States, note 11 supra. 
14 Ibid. A tax which destroys, of course, cannot be said to raise revenue. For years 
a controversy has raged over the question whether the taxing power may be used only to 
raise revenue. Cf. Cushman, "Social and Economic Control Through Taxation," 18 l\1INN. 
L. REv. 757 at 764 (1934) and Brown, "When Is a Tax Not a Tax,'' 11 lND. L.J. 399 
(1936). 
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a certain manner, have been upheld as incidental to the collection of the tax.15 
On the other hand, the Court has declared that Congress may not prescribe 
regulations concerning activities in themselves subject only to state regulation 
and then "tax'' violations thereof.16 Such a "tax" is a penalty, and Congress 
may not penalize the ·doing of that which it cannot prohibit. However, in 
some statutes overthrown on this ground the purpose of Congress is no more 
apparent than it is where a tax is merely prohibitive, and it seems that where 
this approach is used the Court, of necessity, has to go beyond the face of the 
statute and examine the motives of Congress or at least the effect of the legis-
lation.17 The instant case would seem to £t into this somewhat confusing 
picture with ease. The occupation of wagering is clearly a proper subject for 
federal taxation though not for direct regulation. The regulation in the act 
is achieved through the registration provisions which seem to be incidental to, 
and an aid in the collection of, the tax. Indeed, such requirements hardly seem 
regulatory at all, and can be considered prohibitive only insofar as they require 
the disclosure of activities that are in violation of state law and then only if 
the state, not the federal, authorities take action. Certainly the provisions 
of the Gamblers' Tax are less regulatory than those upheld in the Narcotic 
Drug Act cases.18 The penal provisions of the instant statute levy a penalty 
not on those who violate regulations concerning activities beyond the control 
of Congress, as was done in the Child Labor Tax,19 but on those who fail to 
pay the tax or willfully violate regulations designed to aid the collection of the 
tax. It is obvious, of course, that the Gamblers' Tax grew out of the Kefauver 
Crime Committee investigations and was designed in part to tax out of exist-
ence that which the states had not prosecuted-out of existence. However, the 
debat~ on the Hoor of Congress show that the statute was also designed for the 
purpose of raising additional revenue.20 Thus, even if the Court had looked 
to the motives behind the statute, it would have found ample evidence of an 
intent to pass a revenue measure. Clearly the decision is correct.21 
James. W. Callison, S.Ed. 
15 Note 8 supra. 
16 Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 42 S.Ct. 449 (1922); Hill v. Wallace, 
259 U.S. 44, 42 S.Ct. 453 (1922); Cf. United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 56 
S.Ct. 223 (1935), involving a statute levying a tax on activities in violation of state law. 
See Cushman, "Social and Economic Control Through Taxation," 18 MINN. L. REv. 757 
at 778 (1934); 21 CoRN. L.Q. 106 (1935). 
17 Compare the cases cited in note 16 supra with McCray v. United States, note 11 
supra; see Cushman, "Social and Economic Control Through Taxation," 18 MINN. L. REv. 
757 at 780 et seq. (1934). 
18 See note 8 supra. 
19 Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., note 16 supra. 
20 See 97 CoNG. REc. 6891, 12238 (1951); cf. Senator Kefauver's discussion at 12230. 
21 Excellent general discussions on the whole problem of regulation through taxation 
will be found in Cushman, "Social and Economic Control Through Federal Taxation," 18 
MINN. L. REv. 757 (1934); Brown, ''When Is a Tax Not a Tax," 11 IND. L.J. 399 (1936) 
and Brown, "The Excise Tax as a Regulatory Device,'' 23 CoRN. L.Q. 45 (1937). 
